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The term “popular culture” is mostly 
used to describe either cultural prac-
tices or products that are widespread 
and available for mass consumption or 
those practices that belong to the cultur-
al sphere of “ordinary” people. The use 
of this concept in scholarly research and 
debate, however, is far from concise and 
often lacks the analytical clarity needed 
for sound and convincing knowledge 
production. Lacking a precise and viable 
definition for this concept, this essay ar-
gues for abolishing it in favor of the con-
cept of “culture,” which in itself can be 
operationalized so as to accommodate 
all forms and practices that can be per-
ceived as cultural. The central argument 
consists of a critique of the inherent clas-
sifications of culture through respective 
adjectives that inevitably lead to norma-
tive assumptions and presuppose specif-
ic research questions or methods.
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The Residue of Culture
Researching culture incorporates the 
complex question of classifications, either 
implicitly or explicitly, of what kind of cul-
ture it is, to which part of the spheres of 
human existence it relates to, where it is 
situated in society. Mostly the respective 
practices of, e.g. hip hop, craftsmanship or 
club-culture, are viewed as being part of 
the realm of “popular culture,” as com-
modities for (mass-) consumption or as the 
practices and aesthetics of “ordinary” peo-
ple. This perspective is problematic in a 
myriad of ways and leads to a row of dif-
ficult questions to properly situate the 
analysis of cultures that are perceived as 
“popular,” some of which I will address in 
this essay. First: What is it that makes a cul-
ture “popular” and how is this different 
than a culture being just that, without the 
adjective “popular”? By using the concept 
of “popular culture” one strengthens the 
notion of it being a residual category that 
can be placed in opposition to something 
most often called “high culture;” this, in 
turn, incorporates specific claims regard-
ing the assumed “complexity,” “depth,” 
and “relevance” of certain cultural prac-
tices as opposed to others. Second: Is the 
Differentiation analytically viable? In schol-
arly treatments of the “popular” or, in con-
nection, “the ordinary,” the use of these 
adjectives is often poorly reflected upon 
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and their meaning taken for granted, 
which eventually leads to a weakening of 
the respective argument.
In these cases, “popular culture” is a term 
adding rather than subtracting problems 
to research on specific cultural practices 
as it assumes some sort of normative dis-
position and general “quality.” On these 
grounds, my argument is to instead use 
the term “culture” and apply it to any situ-
ation or discourse that is concerned with 
ways and means of creating and sustain-
ing shared meanings and concepts in a 
form that is social and quintessentially 
normative, but never temporally or spa-
tially fixed. 
In other words: “Culture […] is involved 
in all those practices […] which carry 
meaning and value for us, which need to 
be meaningfully interpreted by others, 
or which depend on meaning for their 
effective operation. Culture, in this sen-
se, permeates all society.” (Hall 3) 
Thus, the very concept of culture seems 
broad, but can be put to use in quite spe-
cific ways. On the one hand, by under-
standing the concept of culture as incor-
porating all forms and manifestations of 
cultural activity on disparate levels and in 
all segments of society, cultural practices 
can be analyzed while being uncon-
strained by perceived qualifications and 
categories with inherent normative 
assumptions. Deconstructing those pre-
sumptive frames and discourses, the 
observer is enabling him— or herself to 
engage with cultural practices on their 
own terms;  to ask what a specific practice 
or belief entails for the practitioner and 
why. Rather than assuming that the 
respective practices and beliefs are 
already located in a certain segment of 
society and discourse and by that, conse-
quently, in need of some specific theo-
retical approach and methodological set 
of tools.
Ordinary
In his much hailed book Life as Politics, 
Asef Bayat sets out to describe how “ordi-
nary people change the Middle East” in 
ways not hitherto covered by the theoret-
ical approaches and concepts of social 
movement theory. Lacking organizational 
structures, an ideology or political pro-
gram, and institutional foundations as 
well as acceptance by the state, people in 
the Middle East, Bayat claims, engage in 
a sort of activism on an everyday-basis in 
their daily conduct. What the author is try-
ing to do is to describe these forms of 
contesting material realities by silently cir-
cumventing them in new terms. “Social 
nonmovement,” then, serves as the cate-
gory to grasp the activities and practices 
of an unorganized collective in society 
while the “quiet encroachment of the 
ordinary” is introduced as a concept to 
think about political, social, and economic 
gains and liberties achieved by those 
“ordinary” people in their quest for a 
secure and dignified existence despite 
heavy constrains by their socio-economic 
conditions and the state. Published little 
more than a year before the eruptions of 
the uprisings in several Arabic states in 
2011, commonly framed as “Arab Spring,” 
Bayat’s book seemed almost prophetic as 
it delivered perspectives on aspects of 
the society in the Middle East that could 
seemingly partially explain the reasons 
leading to the uprisings.
In some ways, Bayat’s book contains ques-
tionable concepts and implicit romanti-
cism in its depiction of the “ordinary,” a 
category not delineated in a clear and 
concise manner, which as a result places 
the analytical clarity of the book in doubt. 
Additionally, while Bayat sketches out 
valuable information about the political 
and social conduct of disadvantaged seg-
ments and individuals in the Middle East-
ern society, his treatment lacks the 
acknowledgment that those strategies are 
not reserved for the marginalized. On the 
contrary, just as James Scott makes clear 
in his book Weapons of the Weak:
 “It would be a grave mistake, as it is 
with peasant rebellions, to overly ro-
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manticize the ‘weapons of the weak.’ 
They are unlikely to do more than 
marginally affect the various forms of 
exploitation that peasants confront. 
Furthermore, the peasantry has no mo-
nopoly on these weapons, as anyone 
can easily attest who has observed of-
ficials and landlords resisting and dis-
rupting state policies that are to their 
disadvantage.” (30) 
So, while insisting on the fact that the stra-
tegies of so called “ordinary” people and 
their quest for liberties in a state with a 
repressive government do matter, one 
should be acutely aware of the dangers of 
romanticizing these strategies as some-
thing only the marginalized populace can 
employ. Given the efficiency and the avail-
ability of instruments and means for cir-
cumventing the intended functioning of 
the state’s regulations, one is tempted to 
rather speak of “the quiet encroachment 
of the privileged” if the concept would not 
be lacking analytical merit in itself. From 
the beginning, the strategies described by 
Bayat are far from “quiet” in the sense that 
they cannot be heard or make no sonic 
impression, but rather they occasionally 
include the deliberate and loud proclama-
tion of discontent. Furthermore, the term 
“encroachment” suggests gradual territo-
rial or discursive gains while throughout 
the book, and in reality, this impression 
clearly does not materialize. 
In Life as Politics the “ordinary” becomes 
a residual category to refer generally to 
people—women, youth, unemployed, 
workers, the poor—instead of institu-
tions, agencies, parties or movements. 
On the one hand, this category is rather 
heterogeneous and broad. On the other 
hand, however, it is concise enough to 
suggest a dichotomy in society, a differ-
entiation between the “ordinary” and the 
“not-so-ordinary,” where the “ordinary” 
lacks the level of organization, institu-
tionalization and influence of its counter-
part. Representing the institution of uni-
versity, or at least its idea of knowledge 
production, scholars repeatedly and 
continuously ask questions concerning 
the “ordinary man/woman on the street” 
and his/her beliefs and actions. While 
these questions are vital for a viable 
understanding of society and the human 
being, the term ”ordinary” at the same 
time signifies a form of “othering” and 
the amalgamation of diverse spheres of 
society into a single catchphrase. 
Academic Myths
In its (re-)discovery of the “ordinary” the 
discourses around the events of 2011 
share significant similarities with dis-
courses around what is commonly 
referred to as “popular culture” in aca-
demia. In most cases, it is not quite clear 
what exactly determines the identification 
of subjects or groups as belonging to the 
sphere of the “ordinary” or which prac-
tices are deemed a part of “popular cul-
ture.” The usage of these categories in 
academic writing and debating resem-
bles many aspects of what Edward Said 
termed “Orientalism” in the 1970s, refer-
ring to the relation between Western aca-
demics and the mostly Arab countries 
and societies in the Middle East and North 
Africa that figured as their area of interest. 
This relation, Said argued, is deeply 
flawed and problematic through the ways 
in which the “West” employs material and 
discursive agendas to stylize the “Orient” 
as the principal “other,” making it at once 
a source of sensory indulgence and fear. 
Attempting to research cultural practices 
and communities deemed “popular,” or 
“ordinary,” from the perspective of the 
university contains similar dangers and 
dynamics. It produces claims to power 
and agency in the respective discourses, 
thereby establishing discursive power-
relations where the “popular” often fig-
ures as the “other” to academia, which 
serves as the location of the production of 
“proper,” “scientific” knowledge. 
These power-relations can be observed 
through a use of language that reveals a 
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specific understanding of the worth of 
either of these realms. During a confer-
ence on hip hop at the University of Cam-
bridge in 2016, for example, the view was 
expressed that adherents of hip hop-cul-
ture should feel honored that academics 
see it as an object of study, ennobling hip 
hop through their time and attention. This 
argument can only be made regarding 
cultural forms deemed “popular,” or prac-
tices of “ordinary” people. It is difficult to 
imagine that scholars would demand this 
kind of gratitude, theoretically, from 
Goethe or Mozart, Elias Khoury or Daniel 
Barenboim. Consequentially, this per-
spective carries implicit qualifications 
regarding different cultural practices, 
their worth, relevance, or complexity, 
without ever clarifying that difference in 
an analytically sound and convincing 
manner. The conviction that an object of 
inquiry is elevated and made more rele-
vant by being subject to scholarly scrutiny 
comes with implicit forms of discrimina-
tion that discredit the academic endeavor 
considerably as it unmasks qualitative 
assumptions regarding the object as well 
as the subject of research. 
Considerably adding to these problems, 
the understanding of the life-world of 
“academia” is poorly reflected upon while 
the object(s) of inquiry are deemed as 
requiring heavy scrutinizing. The university 
passes unchallenged as a place of “higher 
learning” and “high culture,” home of the 
greatest thinkers and philosophers and 
constructive agents in the development of 
state and society. To my knowledge, there 
was never any meaningful attempt to sci-
entifically engage in an analysis of the “cul-
ture” of academic institutions. Nonethe-
less, this culture does exist and it prefigures 
discourses and individual speech acts; it is 
involved in judging a research-question as 
significant or superfluous; it guides pro-
fessional interaction and personal con-
duct like every other cultural sphere. Ritu-
als and practices are as much part of the 
everyday conduct of scholars in university 
settings as it is part of the life of tribesmen 
in the Sahel, or, for that matter, of the local 
hip hop-community in Beirut or Hong 
Kong. Realizing differences between these 
practices should not lead us to deem the 
one precious and the other worthless, 
rather, in a quest for real apprehension, we 
should try to understand these rituals and 
practices as tools, as means and not as 
ends in themselves. While the latter could 
be reduced to a common human quest to 
make sense of life and the world, the 
means of doing so may vary without some 
inherent qualification as to the perceived 
usefulness. Indeed, the claim of superior-
ity in the pursuit of knowledge must itself 
be understood as cultural, as a ritualistic 
practice of institutions for “higher” educa-
tion aiming to increase the relevance of 
their practices. In academia, this is tightly 
bound to the myth of objective knowl-
edge production, which leads to the claim 
that this specific form and structure of the 
“scientific” pursuit of knowledge is more 
efficient than other forms or structures.
Popularity and Resistance
This brings me back to the concept of 
“popular culture,” a concept quite en 
vogue in academic debates concerned 
with the societies of states in the Middle 
East after 2011. One possibility for under-
standing “popular culture” seems espe-
cially likely in this context: popular culture 
as “resistance,” as the arena for “speaking 
truth to power,” the realm of the “average 
citizen” to create divergent truths and his-
tories in the face of the hegemonic state 
apparatus. This reading places emphasis 
on the content and attitude of cultural 
practices and narratives and excludes 
other defining criteria like the popularity 
of those practices in society themselves. 
Instead of seeing “high culture” as the 
antagonist concept, it places the “hege-
monic bloc” on the other side of the cul-
tural divide. While this definition of popu-
lar culture seems attractive and sufficient 
in some contexts, and although it could be 
sufficiently rationalized for analysis, it still 
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reiterates some basic flaws concerning the 
persistent but vague antagonisms inher-
ent in the concept itself. Also, the aesthet-
ics of “rebellion” might be used and 
employed by the “hegemonic bloc” in its 
quest for the stabilization of its own rule. 
The researcher may be tempted to view 
such practices as belonging to the realm 
of popular culture—as resistance—while a 
closer look might reveal that the codes 
and signs employed already work to dis-
seminate the meanings furthered by the 
hegemonic bloc.
Other than merely an institution of higher 
education occupied with the production 
of verifiable knowledge, the university 
itself offers excellent opportunities for 
political activism that use language and 
discourse as weapons of choice. This 
might be done deliberately or happen 
rather unconsciously. The same, in flipping 
the coin, is true about the cultural sphere 
most often referred to with the adjective 
“popular.” It can be the site of cultural 
resistance and opposition to something 
which can be called “hegemonic” culture 
(which most probably is, among others, 
situated or produced in university). How-
ever, it might as well be a site for the delib-
erate or subconscious confirmation of 
hegemonic discourse and culture. In hip 
hop, for example, the founding myth is 
strongly connected to the situation of 
being denied a voice in society and con-
sequently finding avenues to express dis-
content and alternative conceptions of life 
through cultural practices and language 
as well as appropriating the physical sur-
rounding through art and movement 
(graffiti and breakdance). Nonetheless, 
the commodification of hip hop and the 
unparalleled success of its products in the 
music industry has led renowned and pio-
neering scholar of hip hop, Tricia Rose, to 
the conclusion that “American mainstream 
hip hop serves as the cultural arm of pred-
atory capitalism”1 and is consequently not 
challenging but rather reinforcing the cen-
tral paradigms of hegemonic discourse in 
the US today.
By appropriating and diverting formerly 
rebellious subcultures to fit into a slightly 
adjusted hegemonic discourse, it is pos-
sible to divert the thrust coming from 
these divergent readings and interpreta-
tions of reality. When the rebel himself is 
being commodified, the rebellion has 
become part of the very system it rebels 
against. The rebellious posture inherent in 
the founding myth of hip hop-culture 
could in this way be made to lose much of 
its impact. The threat of a challenging dis-
course with wide appeal and potential to 
unmask iniquitous aspects of the hege-
monic discourse are thus neutralized by 
appropriation. What is claimed to exem-
plify the cultural power for disrupting 
hegemonic notions and discourses can, 
thus, be appropriated and altered to fit the 
so called “mainstream” or the hegemony. 
This, of course, is congruent with the con-
cept of culture itself, where signs, symbols, 
practices and myths delineate and config-
ure a cultural sphere which is by definition 
neither stable nor fixed nor easily con-
fined and put to use.
“Culture” is comprised of the very prac-
tices that are in themselves arbitrary and 
dependent on the spatial, social, eco-
nomic, and political context. A practice 
judged as defective and useless by some 
might become the very cornerstone of 
another group‘s identity; a practice con-
sidered as outright rebellious by some can 
be rather conformist for others or that very 
same practice could be deemed central in 
the preservation of power by the hege-
monic bloc in a different geographical or 
social environment (see also the contribu-
tion by John Story in this issue). Under-
standing this dimension of culture as cru-
cial for every cultural practice and 
discourse makes the differentiation 
between “popular” and “high” redundant. 
This leaves us with the problem of prop-
erly and sufficiently understanding the 
concept of “culture” itself in order to give 
it practical application through a sound 
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and well defined analysis of anything “cul-
tural,” whether it be punkrock or 
Beethoven, fashion or eating habits,  gos-
sip or opera, or the cultural practices on 
construction sites or those at academic 
conferences.
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Notes
1 „Versus Hip Hop on 
Trial Debate.“ YouTube. 
27.06.2012. Web. The quote 
in question can be found at 
about 35:00.
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